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Abstract
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own
state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling
problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino. Under natural
assumptions (such as continuous running payoff and non expansive transitions), we
consider for each discount factor the value vλ of the λ-discounted stochastic game
and investigate its limit when λ goes to 0. We show that under a strong acyclicity
condition, the limit exists and is characterized as the unique solution of a system
of functional equations: the limit is the unique continuous excessive and depressive
function such that each player, if his opponent does not move, can reach the zone when
the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without degrading the limit
value. The approach generalizes and provides a new viewpoint on the Mertens-Zamir
system coming from the study of zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on
both sides. A counterexample shows that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity,
convergence of (vλ) may fail.
1 Introduction
The model of zero-sum stochastic games was introduced by Shapley [29] in
1953. A state variable ω ∈ Ω follows a controlled Markov chain with transi-
tions Q(ω˜|i, j, ω) controlled by the actions of two competing players (i ∈ I for
player 1 and j ∈ J for player 2). Shapley assumed the action and state spaces (I,
J and Ω) to be finite and proved the existence of the value vλ of the λ-discounted
game using a dynamic programming principle, and characterized vλ as the unique
fixed point of what has been called the Shapley operator [28, 31].
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Bewley and Kohlberg [3], using algebraic tools, proved the existence of the
asymptotic value v = limλ→0vλ. Actually, when action and state spaces are finite,
the equations that define vλ may be described by finitely many polynomial in-
equalities, implying that vλ is semi-algebraic and so is converging. The extension
of this result to infinite stochastic games is a central question in mathematical
game theory [16, 22, 24, 31].
Recently, several important conjectures [20, 22] were proved to be false. Vig-
eral [33] and Ziliotto [34] provided examples where the family {vλ} diverges as λ
approaches zero. In Vigeral, the state space Ω is finite and the action sets I and
J are semi-algebraic. In Ziliotto, the set of actions is finite but the state space
Ω is compact, and can be seen as the space of common beliefs on a finite state
variable, controlled but not observed by the players.
On the other hand, there are many classes of stochastic games with general
state space and action sets where {vλ} converges (for a recent survey, see [16]).
Many have in common some irreversibility in the transitions. In recursive games
[8, 32] the current payoff is zero until the game is absorbed. In absorbing games
[12, 21, 28] there is only one non-absorbing state. In repeated games with incom-
plete information [2, 23, 28], once a player reveals some information, he cannot
withdraw it. Similarly in splitting games [14, 15, 31] the state follows a martin-
gale which eventually converges. Interestingly, in all those classes of “irreversible”
stochastic games, not only we have convergence but also an explicit characteri-
zation of the asymptotic value. This leads many to anticipate that irreversibility
has to do with convergence.
Our paper provides a weak and a strong definition of irreversibility (we call
acyclicity) and prove that they constitute the frontier between convergence and
divergence of {vλ}: strong acyclicity guarantee convergence while the closely
related weak acyclicity do not. To do so, we restrict ourself to a new class which
embeds any product stochastic game [9] and naturally extends gambling houses.
A classical gambling house problem [6, 19] has three ingredients : a metric
state space S, a Borel-measurable utility function u : S → IR, and a gambling
house Φ, where Φ is a set value function that assigns to each s ∈ S a set Φ(s) of
∆(S) (set of Borel probability distributions over S). At each stage t, given the
state st, the decision maker gets the reward u(st), chooses pt ∈ Φ(st), and the
state moves to st+1 according to the probability distribution pt.
The gambling house is leavable if for every s ∈ S, δs (the dirac mass at s)
belongs to Φ(s). It is well known that any MDP can be mapped to a gambling
house and any positive MDP to a leavable gambling house [7, 19, 30]. In this
paper, we consider only leavable gambling houses.
In a gambling game, each player controls his gambling house: Γ : X → ∆(X)
for Player 1 and Λ : Y → ∆(Y ) for Player 2, and the utility function is now
u : X × Y → IR with the convention that player 1 wants to maximize u whereas
player 2 wants to minimize u. At each stage t, both players knowing the state
ωt = (xt, yt), simultaneously Player 1 chooses pt in Γ(xt) and Player 2 chooses
qt ∈ Λ(yt), the stage payoff is u(xt, yt) and a new state (xt+1, yt+1) is selected
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according to the probability distribution pt ⊗ qt. As any MDP can be mapped
into a gambling house, a product stochastic game [9] can be mapped into a
gambling game.
For each λ ∈ (0, 1], one can define the λ-discounted game where the stream
of payoffs is evaluated according to
∑
t=1 λ(1− λ)t−1u(xt, yt). Usually λ is called
the discount rate, 1 − λ = 1
1+r
is called the discount factor and r is the interest
rate. Under classical regularity assumptions, the λ-discounted game has a value
vλ and the family {vλ} is equi-continuous.
Our first main result shows that if at least one of the gambling houses Γ or
Λ is strongly acyclic, {vλ} uniformly converges to a function v as λ goes to 0.
Moreover, we provide several characterizations of the asymptotic value v that
extend the well known Mertens-Zamir system of functional equations [23]. Our
second result proves that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, {vλ} may
diverge (even if both houses Γ and Λ are weakly acyclic and both state spaces
X and Y are finite). Our example is inspired by an example in Ziliotto [34]
for stochastic games where both players control the same state variable. It is
the first in the class of product stochastic games, and appears simpler than the
existing counterexamples of divergence with finite state space. Finally, under an
idempotent assumption combined with a bounded variation hypothesis on the
transitions, we prove existence of the uniform value, extending a recent result by
Oliu-Barton [25] on splitting games.
2 Gambling Games
2.1 Notations
Given a compact metric space S, we denote by B(S), resp. by C(S), the set of
bounded measurable, resp. continuous, functions from S to the reals, and by
∆(S) the set of Borel probabilities over S. For s in S, we denote by δs ∈ ∆(S)
the Dirac measure on s, and whenever possible we assimilate s and δs. For v in
B(S), we denote by v˜ its affine extension to ∆(S): v˜(p) = IEp(v) for all p in ∆(S),
where IEp(v) is the expectation of v with respect to p. ∆(S) is endowed with the
weak-* topology, a compatible distance being the Kantorovich-Rubinstein (or
Wasserstein of order 1) metric: dKR(p, p
′) = supv∈E1 |v˜(p) − v˜(p′)|, where E1 is
the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on S. When there is no confusion, v˜(p) will also
be denoted by v(p).
2.2 Model
A gambling game is a zero-sum stochastic game where each player controls his own
state variable. We will always assume in this paper that the state spaces are non
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empty metric and compact, and denote by X and Y the respective set of states1
controlled by Player 1 and by Player 2. The transitions of Player 1 are given by
a continuous2 multifunction Γ : X ⇒ ∆(X) with non empty convex3 compact
values: if the state of Player 1 is at x, he can select his new state according to
any probability in Γ(x). Similarly, a continuous multifunction Λ : Y ⇒ ∆(Y )
with non empty convex compact values, gives the transitions of Player 2. The
players independently control their own state, and only interact through payoffs:
the running payoff of Player 1 is given by a continuous mapping u : X×Y −→ IR,
and the payoff to Player 2 is given by −u.
Gambling games extend the model of gambling houses [6], which correspond
to the single player case when Y is a singleton and Player 2 plays no role. One can
show, by an adequate increase of the state space in order to encompass actions,
that any MDP can be mapped into a gambling house [7, 19, 30].
A standard gambling house is the red-and-black casino where X = [0, 1] is a
fortune space. Suppose that at each fortune x ≥ 0, the gambler can stake any
amount s in her possession. The gambler loses the stake with probability 1 − w
where w ∈ (0, 1) is fixed and given, and wins back the stake and an additional
equal amount with probability w. The corresponding transition multiifunction
reads:
Φw(x) = {wδmin{x+s,1} + (1− w)δx−s : 0 ≤ s ≤ x}.
Another class of gambling house are splitting problems where X = ∆(K) is a
simplex (K is a finite set) and Γ(x) is the set of Borel probabilities on X centered
at x. The idea of splitting was introduced by Aumann and Maschler [2] in the
context of repeated games with incomplete information on one side. This is now
very popular in economics (persuasion and information design literature [13]).
The above examples of gambling houses naturally extend to gambling games.
One can consider a casino game where each player i controls a red-and-black
house with parameter wi, and the running payoff depends on the current pair of
fortunes. Another example is a splitting game [14, 15, 31] where X = ∆(K) and
Y = ∆(L) are simplexes, Γ(x) is the set of Borel probability measures on X that
are centered at x and Λ(y) is the set of probability measures of Borel probability
measures on Y that are centered at y.
2.3 Discounted Evaluations
Given a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and an initial state (x1, y1) in X×Y , the game
Gλ(x1, y1) is played as follows: at any stage t ≥ 1, the payoff to Player 1 is u(xt, yt)
and both players knowing (xt, yt), simultaneously Player 1 chooses pt+1 in Γ(xt)
1Both metrics are denoted by d, and we will use the metric d((x, y), (x′, y′)) = d(x, x′) +
d(y, y′) on X × Y .
2i.e. ∀ε > 0, ∃α > 0, ∀x, x′ ∈ X with d(x, x′) ≤ α, ∀p ∈ Γ(x), ∃p′ ∈ Γ(x′) s.t. dKR(p, p′) ≤ ε.
Since Γ has compact values, it implies that the graph of Γ is compact.
3If originally the gambling game has non convex values, then allowing as usual players to
randomize, would lead to transitions with convex values.
4
and Player 2 chooses qt+1 in Λ(yt). Then, xt+1 and yt+1 are independently selected
according to pt and qt, the new states xt+1 and yt+1 are publicly announced, and
the play goes to stage t + 1. Under our assumptions of compact state spaces,
continuous transitions with convex compact values and continuous running payoff,
it is easy to describe the value of such dynamic game.
Definition 2.1. vλ is the unique element of C(X × Y ) s.t. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
vλ(x, y) = max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(λu(x, y) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p, q)) ,
= min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
(λu(x, y) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p, q)) .
This is the standard characterization of the value of a discounted game by means
of the Shapley operator. Existence and uniqueness of vλ follow from standard
fixed-point arguments (see for instance [22, 28]). We refer to vλ(x, y) as the value
of the game Gλ(x, y).
The goal of the paper is to study the convergence of (vλ)λ when λ goes to 0,
i.e. when players become more and more patient.
Remark 2.2. Cesaro Evaluations. It is also standard to define the value of the
n-stage games by: v1 = u, and for n ≥ 1 and (x, y) ∈ X × Y :
vn+1(x, y) =
1
n + 1
max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(u(x, y) + nv˜n(p, q)) ,
=
1
n + 1
min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
(u(x, y) + nv˜n(p, q)) .
It is known that the uniform convergence of (vn)n when n goes to infinity, is
equivalent to the uniform convergence of (vλ)λ when λ goes to 0, and in case of
convergence both limits are the same (Theorem 2.2 in [35] applies here)
2.4 Non expansive transitions
Without further assumptions, convergence of (vλ) may fail even in the simple
case where Γ and Λ are single-valued (“0 player case”, players have no choice), so
we will assume throughout the paper that the gambling game is non expansive,
i.e. have non expansive transitions:
Definition 2.3. The game has non expansive transitions if:
∀x ∈ X, ∀x′ ∈ X, ∀p ∈ Γ(x), ∃p′ ∈ Γ(x′), s.t. dKR(p, p′) ≤ d(x, x′),
and similarly : ∀y ∈ Y, ∀y′ ∈ Y, ∀q ∈ Λ(y), ∃q′ ∈ Λ(y′), s.t. dKR(q, q′) ≤ d(y, y′).
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The gambling game has non expansive transitions if the transitions, viewed
as mappings from X to 2∆(X), and from Y to 2∆(Y ), are 1-Lipschitz for the
Hausdorff distance on compact subsets of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Note that the tran-
sitions are always non expansive when X and Y are finite4. Moreover split-
ting games are non expansive [14], and red-and-black casino houses with pa-
rameter w are non-expansive if and only if w ≤ 1
2
[17]. Let us mention also
Markov chain repeated games with incomplete information [11], where each player
observes a private and exogenous Markov chain. These repeated games lead
to gambling houses with transitions of the form: X is a simplex ∆(K), and
Γ(x) = {pM, p ∈ ∆(X) centered at x} with M a fixed stochastic matrix. Here
again, transitions are non expansive.
Let us mention immediately an important consequence of the non expansive
assumption. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.4. Assume the gambling game is non-expansive. Then the family
{vλ}λ∈(0,1] is equicontinuous.
This proposition extends to two players a similar result in [17] on gambling
houses where it is proved that non-expansivity is necessary and sufficient to guar-
antee equi-continuity of the values. As a consequence, pointwise and uniform
convergence of {vλ} are equivalent, and since X × Y is compact, to prove this
convergence it is enough to prove uniqueness of a limit point5.
Remark 2.5. It is not difficult to see that without non-expansivity, {vλ} may
not be equicontinuous and the convergence may not be uniform. For instance in
red-and-black casino with a single player, if the parameter w > 1
2
and u(x) = x,
vλ is continuous for every λ but v = limλ→0vλ is not : v(x) = 0 for x = 0 and
v(x) = 1 for x > 0.
2.5 Excessive, depressive and balanced functions
Definition 2.6. Let v be in B(X × Y ).
1) v is balanced if ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x)minq∈Γ(y) v˜(p, q) = minq∈Γ(y)maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, q).
2) v is excessive (with respect to X) if: ∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y , v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, y).
3) v is depressive (with respect to Y ) if: ∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y , v(x, y) = minq∈Γ(y) v˜(x, q).
Observe that any uniform limit v of (vλ)λ∈(0,1] is necessarily continuous and
balanced (by passing to the limit in definition 2.1). In a splitting game, excessive
means concave with respect to the first variable, and depressive means convex
with respect to the second variable.
4If X is finite and d(x, x′) = 2 for x 6= x′, then dKR(p, p′) = ‖p− p′‖1 for p, p′ in ∆(X).
5By convergence or limit point of {vλ}, we always mean when λ approaches 0.
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Example 2.7. Consider a gambling game where players 1 and 2 move on the
same finite grid of a circle containing 6 nodes in equidistant positions. Any player
can move one step to the left, one step to the right, or not move (and choose
randomly between these 3 options, so that transitions have convex values). It is
here possible for a player to go from any state to any other state in at most 3
stages (the game may be called cyclic), so any excessive and depressive function
is necessarily constant. Suppose that Player 1’s payoff is 1 if he is at most one
step away from Player 2, and Player 1’s payoff is 0 otherwise. If the players start
a distance at most 1, Player 1 can guarantee this property will hold forever by
not moving or moving one step to the direction of Player 2 and so, in this case
we have vλ = 1 for every λ. On the other hand, if the players start at a distance
at least 2, Player 2 can insure that this property will hold forever, by not moving
or moving one step in the opposite direction of Player 1. For these initial states,
vλ = 0 for every λ. Here, v = lim vλ is continuous and balanced, but not excessive
nor depressive.
2.6 Acyclicity
We now come to the main definitions of the paper.
Definition 2.8.
1) The gambling game is leavable if: ∀x ∈ X, δx ∈ Γ(x) and ∀y ∈ Y, δy ∈ Λ(y).
2) The gambling house Γ of player 1 is weakly acyclic if there exists ϕ in B(X)
lower semi-continuous such that:
∀x ∈ X,Argmaxp∈Γ(x)ϕ˜(p) = {δx}.
Similarly, the gambling house Λ of player 2 is weakly acyclic if there exists ψ in
B(Y ) upper semi-continuous such that:
∀y ∈ Y,Argminq∈Λ(y)ψ˜(q) = {δy}.
The gambling game is weakly acyclic if both gambling houses are weakly acyclic.
The gambling game is leavable if each player can remain in any given state.
This is a standard assumption [6]. This is the case in red-and-black casinos and
splitting games. In persuasion games and in repeated games with incomplete
information, not moving means revealing no information. If the game is leavable,
any excessive and depressive function is necessarily balanced. The converse is not
necessarily true as example 2.7 shows.
Weak acyclicity is, to our knowledge, a new condition in the gambling house
literature. If the house Γ is weakly acyclic, the “potential” ϕ decreases in expec-
tation along non stationary trajectories, hence the irreversibility of the process
(in the space of probabilities over X).
Observe that any weakly acyclic gambling game is necessarily leavable. When
w ≤ 1
2
, a red-and-black casino is weakly acyclic (take ϕ to be strictly increasing
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and strictly concave). Also, a splitting game is weakly acyclic (take ϕ to be any
strictly concave function on X).
We will now define strong acyclicity, our central condition. For this, we need
to consider transitions for several stages. We first extend linearly the transitions
to ∆(X) and ∆(Y ) by defining Γ˜ : ∆(X)⇒ ∆(X) and Λ˜ : ∆(Y )⇒ ∆(Y ). More
precisely, the graph of Γ˜ is defined as the closure of the convex hull of the graph of
Γ (viewed as the subset {(δx, p), x ∈ X, p ∈ Γ(x)} of ∆(X)×∆(X)), and similarly
the graph of Λ˜ is defined as the closed convex hull of the graph of Λ. Because
Dirac measures are extreme points of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ), we have Γ˜(δx) = Γ(x) and
Λ˜(δy) = Λ(y) for each x in X and y in Y . Be careful that in general, for p in ∆(X)
and q in ∆(Y ): v˜λ(p, q) 6= maxp′∈Γ˜(p)minq′∈Λ˜(q) (λu(p, q) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p′, q′)) .
We now define inductively a sequence of transitions (Γ˜n)n from ∆(X) to ∆(X),
by Γ˜0(p) = {p} for every state p in ∆(X), and6 for each n ≥ 0, Γ˜n+1 = Γ˜n ◦ Γ˜ .
Γ˜n(δx) represents the set of probabilities over states that Player 1 can reach in n
stages from the initial state x in X . Similarly we define Λ˜n for each n.
Definition 2.9.
1) The reachable set of Player 1 from state x in X is the closure of
⋃
n≥0 Γ˜
n(δx)
in ∆(X), and denoted Γ∞(x). Similarly, the reachable set of Player 2 from state
y in Y is the subset Λ∞(y) of ∆(Y ) defined as the closure of
⋃
n≥0 Λ˜
n(δy).
2) The gambling house Γ of player 1 is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic) if
there exists ϕ in B(X) lower semi-continuous such that:
∀x ∈ X,Argmaxp∈Γ∞(x)ϕ˜(p) = {δx}.
Similarly, the gambling house Λ of player 2 is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic)
if there exists ψ in in B(Y ) upper semi-continuous such that:
∀y ∈ Y,Argminq∈Λ∞(y)ψ˜(q) = {δy}.
The gambling game is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic) if both gambling houses
are strongly acyclic.
Clearly, strong acyclicity implies weak acyclicity. Note that in splitting games,
we have Γ ◦ Γ = Γ, so Γ∞ = Γ and weak and strong acyclicity coincide.
3 Main Results
In all the paper (and in particular the results below), we consider standard gam-
bling games.
6The composition being defined by G ◦H(p) = {p” ∈ ∆(X), ∃p′ ∈ H(p) s.t. p” ∈ G(p′)}.
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Definition 3.1. A gambling game is standard if both state spaces X and Y are
compact metric, the running payoff u is continuous, and the transitions Γ and Λ
have non empty convex compact values and are leavable and non expansive.
We will also use the following properties.
Definition 3.2. Given v in B(X × Y ), we say that :
v satisfies P1 if: ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃p ∈ Γ∞(x), v(x, y) = v˜(p, y) ≤ u(p, y),
v satisfies P2 if : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃q ∈ Λ∞(y), v(x, y) = v˜(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a standard gambling game.
1. If at least one of the players has a strongly acyclic gambling house, (vλ) uni-
formly converges to the unique function v in C(X × Y ) satisfying:
a) v is excessive , i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, y),
b) v is depressive, i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , v(x, y) = minq∈Γ(y) v˜(x, q),
c) v satisfies P1, i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y, ∃p ∈ Γ∞(x), v(x, y) = v˜(p, y) ≤ u(p, y),
d) v satisfy P2, i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃q ∈ Λ∞(y), v(x, y) = v˜(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
Moreover: v is the largest excessive-depressive continuous function satisfying P1,
and is the smallest excessive-depressive continuous function satisfying P2.
2. If both gambling houses are weakly acyclic, convergence of (vλ) may fail.
The conditions of the positive result 1) may be interpreted as follows:
• a) and b) : It is always safe not to move. For each player, not moving
ensures not to degrade the limit value.
• c) and d) : Each player can reach, if his opponent does not move, the zone
when the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without
degrading the limit value.
These interpretations will lead later to the construction of simple uniformly op-
timal strategies in some gambling games, see section 7.3.
The positive result of theorem 3.3 relies on the following three propositions.
Recall that thanks to proposition 2.4, to get convergence of the values it is enough
to show uniqueness of a limit point of (vλ)λ.
9
Proposition 3.4. Assume one of the player has a weakly acyclic gambling house.
If v in C(X × Y ) is balanced, then v is excessive and depressive.
Proposition 3.5. Let v be a limit point of (vλ) for the uniform convergence.
Then v is balanced, and satisfies P1 and P2.
Proposition 3.6. Assume one of the player has a strongly acyclic gambling
house. Then, any balanced continuous function satisfying P1 is smaller that any
balanced continuous function satisfying P2. Consequently, there is at most one
balanced continuous function satisfying P1 and P2.
If none of the player has a strongly acyclic gambling house, there may be
infinitely many balanced continuous functions satisfying P1 and P2. This will
be the case in our counter-example of section 6, where both gambling houses are
weakly acyclic.
4 Examples
4.1 A simple acyclic gambling house
Let us first illustrate our characterization on a simple example. Consider the
following Markov decision process with 3 states: X = {a, b, c} from [31]. States b
and c are absorbing with respective payoffs 1 and 0. Start at a, choose α ∈ I =
[0, 1/2], and move to b with proba α and to c with proba α2.
✧✦
★✥
a
0
✧✦
★✥
b
1* ✧✦
★✥
c
0*
✠
✛
α
1− α− α2
α2
❘
Here formally Y is a singleton (there is only one player, so we can omit the variable
y), Γ(b) = {δb}, Γ(c) = {δc}, and Γ(a) = conv{(1−α−α2)δa+αδb+α2δc, α ∈ I}.
The payoffs are u(a) = u(c) = 0, u(b) = 1.
Γ has compact convex values, the transitions are 1-Lipschitz, and the game
is leavable. The gambling game is strongly acyclic: just consider ϕ such that
ϕ(a) = 1, and ϕ(b) = ϕ(c) = 0.
Player 1 can go from state a to state b in infinitely many stages with arbitrarily
high probability, by repeating a choice of α > 0 small (so that α2 is much smaller
than α), and the limit value v clearly satisfies:
v(a) = v(b) = 1, v(c) = 0.
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This is the unique function w : X → IR satisfying the conditions a), b), c),
d) of Theorem 3.3: P1 and P2 implies u ≤ w ≤ 1, and because b and c are
absorbing states, w(b) = 1 and w(c) = 0. Finally, w excessive gives w(a) = 1.
Notice that δb ∈ Γ∞(a) but for each n, δb /∈ Γ˜n(a).
4.2 A weakly acyclic gambling house
Let us modify the gambling house of the previous section 4.1. We still have
a unique player and a state space X = {a, b, c}. The only difference is that
state b is no longer absorbing : in state b the player also has to choose some
α ∈ I = [0, 1/2], and then moves to a with probability α, to c with probability
α2 and remains in b with probability 1− α− α2.
✧✦
★✥
a
✧✦
★✥
b
✧✦
★✥
c
✠
✛
α
1− α− α2
α2
❘✒
α
✒
1− α− α2
✲
α2
States a and b are now symmetric. This gambling house is weakly acyclic,
with ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 1, ϕ(c) = 0, but it is not strongly acyclic since a ∈ Γ∞(b)
and b ∈ Γ∞(a). We will later use this gambling house to construct our counter-
example of theorem 3.3, 2).
4.3 An example with countable state spaces
We present here a (strongly) acyclic gambling game with countable state spaces,
and illustrate7 the proof of proposition 3.4, that under weak acyclicity any con-
tinuous balanced function is also excessive and depressive. Consider the state
space:
X = {1− 1
n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {1} = {x1, ..., xn, ...., x∞},
where xn = 1− 1n if n is finite, and x∞ = 1. We use d(x, x′) = |x− x′|, so that X
is countable and compact. The transition is given by:
Γ(xn) = {αδxn + (1− α)δxn+1, α ∈ [0, 1]}, and Γ(x∞) = {δx∞}.
7We have first studied and understood this example before proving proposition 3.4. Example
2.7 shows that weakening the assumption of weakly acyclic gambling game to leavable gambling
game is not possible in this proposition.
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The intuition is clear: Player 1 can stay at his location, or move 1 to the right.
The gambling house (Y,Λ) of Player 2 is a copy of the gambling house of Player
1. Transitions are non expansive (since | 1
n+1
− 1
n′+1
| ≤ | 1
n
− 1
n′
|), and the game is
strongly acyclic. The payoff u is any continuous function X × Y −→ IR, so that
theorem 3.3 applies.
Consider v : X × Y −→ IR, and for simplicity we use w(n,m) = v(xn, xm).
Here v excessive means that w(n,m) is weakly decreasing in n, and v depressive
means that w(n,m) is weakly increasing in m. The meaning of v balanced is
the following: for each n and m, w(n,m) is the value of the matrix game (“local
game” at (n,m)): (
w(n+ 1, m) w(n+ 1, m+ 1)
w(n,m) w(n,m+ 1)
)
.
Clearly, if v is excessive and depressive it is balanced, but proposition 3.4
tells that if v is continuous, then the converse also holds: balancedness implies
excessiveness and depressiveness. The idea of the proof of proposition 3.4 can be
seen here as follows.
Suppose v is balanced, but not excessive. Then one can find n andm such that
w(n+ 1, m) > w(n,m). Because w(n,m) is the value of the local game at (n,m),
we necessarily have w(n+1, m+1) ≤ w(n,m), and w(n+1, m) > w(n+1, m+1).
Consider now the “local game” at (n+1, m). w(n+1, m) is the value of the matrix:(
w(n+ 2, m) w(n+ 2, m+ 1)
w(n+ 1, m) w(n+ 1, m+ 1)
)
.
Since w(n + 1, m) > w(n+ 1, m+ 1), we obtain w(n + 2, m+ 1) ≥ w(n+ 1, m).
We have obtained: w(n+ 2, m+ 1) ≥ w(n+ 1, m) > w(n,m) ≥ w(n+ 1, m+ 1),
so
w(n+ 2, m+ 1)− w(n+ 1, m+ 1) > w(n+ 1, m)− w(n,m).
Iterating the argument, we obtain that for each p,
w(n+ p+ 1, m+ p) ≥ w(n+ 1, m)− w(n,m) > 0.
And this is a contradiction with w being continuous at infinity.
To conclude with this example, consider the simple case where the running
payoff is given by u(x, y) = |x − y|. Player 1 wants to be far from Player 2,
and Player 2 wants to be close to Player 1. If initially n < m, it is optimal
for each player not to move, so w(n,m) = |xn − xm|. Suppose on the contrary
that initially n ≥ m, so that Player 1 is more to the right than Player 2. Then
Player 2 has a simple optimal strategy which is to move to the right if the current
positions satisfy x > y, and to stay at y if x = y. No matter how large is the
initial difference n − m, Player 2 will succeed in being close to player, so that
w(n,m) = 0 if n ≥ m.
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5 Proof of Theorem 3.3, part 1.
We prove here propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
5.1 Proof of proposition 3.4
By symmetry, suppose that Γ is weakly acyclic and Λ Leavable. Let us prove
that any balanced continuous function v is excessive-depressive. First let us first
prove that v is excessive.
Fix any (x0, y0) in X × Y , and p1 ∈ Γ(x0). A direct consequence of bal-
ancedness is the existence of q1 in Λ(y0) such that v(p1, q1) ≤ v(x0, y0). Now, p1
is in ∆(X) and q1 is in ∆(Y ). One has to be careful that there may not exist
p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that for all q2 ∈ Λ˜(q1), v(p2, q2) ≥ v(p1, q1). This is because,
v˜ being affine in each variable, v(p1, q1) can be interpreted as the value of the
auxiliary game where first x and y are chosen according to p1 ⊗ q1 and observed
by the players, then players respectively choose p ∈ Γ(x) and q ∈ Λ(y) and finally
Player 1’s payoff is v(p, q). And to play well in this game Player 1 has to know
the realization of q1 before choosing p. However since y0 is a Dirac measure,
balancedness implies that there exists p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0).
We have obtained the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Given (x0, y0) in X × Y , and p1 ∈ Γ(x0), there exists q1 in Λ(y0)
and p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that: v(p1, q1) ≤ v(x0, y0) and v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0).
We now prove the proposition. Define, for x in X ,
h(x) = Max{v(p, y)− v(x, y), y ∈ Y, p ∈ Γ(x)}.
h is continuous. We put Z = Argmaxx∈Xh(x), and consider x0 ∈ Argminx∈Zϕ(x),
where ϕ comes from the definition of Γ weakly acyclic.
x0 ∈ Z, so v is excessive if and only if h0 =def h(x0) ≤ 0. By definition of
h(x0), there exists p1 ∈ Γ(x0) and y0 in Y such that v(p1, y0)− v(x0, y0) = h0.
By lemma 5.1, there exists q1 in Λ(y0) and p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that v(p1, q1) ≤
v(x0, y0) and v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0). Consequently,
v(p2, q1)− v(p1, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0)− v(x0, y0) = h0.
One can now find y1 in Y such that v(p2, y1)−v(p1, y1) ≥ h0, and since p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1)
it implies that Supp(p1) ⊂ Z. But p1 ∈ Γ(x0), so by definition of x0 and weak
acyclicity, we obtain that p1 = δx0 . So h0 = 0, and v is excessive.
Let us now prove that when v is balanced and excessive then it is depres-
sive. For every (x, y), and every p ∈ Γ(x), we have v(x, y) ≥ v(p, y). Thus, for
every (x, y), p ∈ Γ(x) and every q ∈ Λ(y), v(x, q) ≥ v(p, q) and consequently,
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minq∈Λ(y) v(x, q) ≥ minq∈Λ(y) v(p, q). Taking the maximum in p ∈ Γ(x) and using
that v is balanced implies that minq∈Λ(y) v(x, q) ≥ v(x, y). Since Λ is leavable, we
have equality and so v is depressive with respect to Y .
5.2 Proof of proposition 3.5
Let (λn)n be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that ‖vλn−v‖ →n→∞ 0.
Fix (x, y) in X×Y , by symmetry it is enough to show that there exists p ∈ Γ∞(x)
such that v(x, y) ≤ v(p, y) ≤ u(p, y). If v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y), it is enough to con-
sider p = δx, so we assume v(x, y) > u(x, y). For n large enough, vλn(x, y) >
u(x, y) + λn.
Fix n. We define inductively a sequence (pnt )t=0,...,Tn in ∆(X), with Tn ≥ 1,
by:
1) pn0 = δx,
2) for each t ≥ 0 such that vλn(pnt , y) > u(pnt , y) + λn, we define pnt+1 in Γ˜(pnt )
by:
pnt+1 ∈ Argmaxp∈Γ˜(pn
t
) (λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(p, y)) .
We have maxp∈Γ˜(pn
t
) (λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(p, y)) ≥ vλn(pnt , y), so:
λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(pnt+1, y) ≥ vλn(pnt , y). (1)
Since u(pnt , y) < vλn(p
n
t , y)− λn, we obtain:
vλn(p
n
t+1, y) ≥ vλn(pnt , y) +
λ2n
1− λn > vλn(p
n
t , y). (2)
Since λ
2
n
1−λn > 0 and vλn is bounded, there exists a first integer t = Tn where
vλn(p
n
Tn
, y) ≤ u(pnTn, y) + λn, and we stop here the definition of the sequence
(pnt )t=0,...,Tn. Inequalities (1) and (2) above give:
vλn(x, y) ≤ vλn(pnTn−1, y) ≤ λnu(pnTn−1, y) + (1− λn)vλn(pnTn, y). (3)
Define now pn = pnTn for each n. p
n ∈ Γ˜Tn(x) ⊂ Γ∞(x) for each n, and we con-
sider a limit point p∗ ∈ Γ∞(x) of (pn)n. Because vλn is an equicontinuous family
converging to v, we obtain the convergence (along a subsequence) of vλn(p
n
Tn
, y)
to v(p∗, y). Passing to the limit in the inequality defining Tn then gives:
v(p∗, y) ≤ u(p∗, y).
Finally, passing to the limit in (3) shows: v(x, y) ≤ v(p∗, y).
5.3 Proof of proposition 3.6
We start with a lemma.
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Lemma 5.2. Assume v in C(X ×Y ) is excessive. Then for all (x0, y0) in X×Y
and all p ∈ Γ∞(x0), we have: v(p, y0) ≤ v(x0, y0).
Proof: p = limnpn, with pn ∈ Γ˜n(x0) for each n. It is enough to prove that
v(pn, y0) ≤ v(x0, y0) for each n, and we do the proof by induction on n. The
case n = 1 is clear by definition of v excessive. Since pn+1 ∈ Γ˜(pn), it is enough
to prove that for p′ in ∆(X) and p′′ ∈ Γ˜(p′), we have v(p′′, y0) ≤ v(p′, y0). By
definition of Γ˜, (p′, p′′) is in the closure of conv(GraphΓ).
y0 is fixed, and the function h : p −→ v(p, y0) is affine continous on ∆(X).
The set
D =def {(p′, p′′) ∈ ∆(X)×∆(X), h(p′′) ≤ h(p′)}.
is convex and compact, and we want to show that Graph(Γ˜) = conv(GraphΓ) ⊂
D. It it enough to prove that Graph(Γ) ⊂ D, and this is implied by the fact that
v is excessive. This concludes the proof of lemma 5.2.
We now prove the proposition. Assume one of the gambling houses is strongly
acyclic, and let v1 and v2 satisfying the conditions of proposition 3.6 (are contin-
uous, balanced, v1 satisfies P1 and v2 satisfies P2). We will show that v1 ≤ v2.
By symmetry, suppose that Γ is strongly acyclic. From Proposition 3.4, v1
and v2 are excessive (in X) and depressive (in Y ). v1 − v2 being continuous on
X × Y , define the compact set:
Z = Argmax(x,y)∈X×Y v1(x, y)− v2(x, y).
Consider now ϕ u.s.c. given by the strong acyclicity condition of Γ. The set
Z being compact, there exists (x0, y0) minimizing ϕ(x) for (x, y) in Z.
By v2 satisfying P2, there exists q in Λ
∞(y0) such that v2(x0, y0) = v2(x0, q) ≥
u(x0, q). Thus, there is y
′
0 ∈ Supp(q) such that v2(x0, y′0) ≥ u(x0, y′0).
Because v1 is depressive, by lemma 5.2 we have v1(x0, q) ≥ v1(x0, y0) and
we obtain v1(x0, q) − v2(x0, q) ≥ v1(x0, y0) − v2(x0, y0). Since (x0, y0) is in Z,
{x0} × Supp(q) ⊂ Z. Thus, (x0, y′0) ∈ Z. Obviously, (x0, y′0) also minimizes ϕ(x)
for (x, y) in Z (the minimum value remains unchanged: ϕ(x0)).
By v1 satisfying P1, there exists p in Γ
∞(x0) such that: v1(x0, y′0) = v1(p, y
′
0) ≤
u(p, y′0). Because v2 is excessive, by lemma 5.2 we have v2(p, y
′
0) ≤ v2(x0, y′0)
and we obtain v1(p, y
′
0) − v2(p, y′0) ≥ v1(x0, y′0) − v2(x0, y′0). Since (x0, y′0) is in
Z, Supp(p) × {y′0} ⊂ Z. By definition of (x0, y′0), this implies: ϕ(p) ≥ ϕ(x0).
The definition of ϕ now gives that p is the Dirac measure on x0. We obtain
that v1(x0, y
′
0) = v1(p, y
′
0) ≤ u(x0, y′0). So Max(x,y)∈X×Y v1(x, y) − v2(x, y) =
v1(x0, y
′
0)− v2(x0, y′0) ≤ u(x0, y′0)− u(x0, y′0) = 0, and thus v1 ≤ v2.
6 A weakly acyclic game without limit value
We conclude here the proof of theorem 3.3 by providing a counterexample to the
convergence of (vλ) in a weakly acyclic non expansive gambling house.
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6.1 The counter-example
The states and transitions for Player 1 are as in example 4.2:
✧✦
★✥
a
✧✦
★✥
b
✧✦
★✥
c
✠
✛
αa
1− αa − α2a
α2a
❘✒
αb
✒
1− αb − α2b
✲
α2b
The set of states of Player 1 is X = {a, b, c}. The difference with example 4.2
is that the set of possible choices for αa and αb may be smaller than [0, 1/2].
Here αa and αb now belong to some fixed compact set I ⊂ [0, 1/2] such8 that
0 is in the closure of I\{0}. Then 0 ∈ I, the transitions are leavable and non
expansive. States a and b are symmetric, this gambling house is weakly acyclic,
with ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 1, ϕ(c) = 0, but not strongly acyclic since a ∈ Γ∞(b) and
b ∈ Γ∞(a).
The gambling house of Player 2 is a copy of the gambling house of Player 1,
with state space Y = {a′, b′, c′} and a compact set of choices J ⊂ [0, 1/2] such
that 0 is in the closure of J\{0}. The unique difference between the gambling
houses of the players is that I and J may be different. Payoffs are simple:
u(x, y) = 0 if x = y, u(x, y) = 1 if x 6= y.
The u function can be written as follows
a′ b′ c′
a 0 1 1
b 1 0 1
c 1 1 0
, with a clear inter-
pretation : Player 1 and Player 2 both move on a space with 3 points, Player 2
wants to be at the same location as Player 1, and Player 1 wants the opposite.
Here the gambling game is weakly acyclic but not strongly acyclic, and the
following lemma shows that the uniqueness property of proposition 3.6 fails.
Lemma 6.1. Let v : X × Y −→ IR. Then A) and B) are equivalent:
A) v is excessive, depressive, and satisfies P1 and P2,
B) There exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that v can be written:
a′ b′ c′
a x x 1
b x x 1
c 0 0 0
8Except in part 2 of theorem 6.2 where we will consider the case I = {0, 1/4}.
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Proof: Assume v satisfies A). Since u takes values in [0, 1], so does also v.
Because c and c′ are absorbing, we have v(c, c′) = u(c, c′) = 0.
Consider now v(c, a′). v being depressive, for any fixed β∗ > 0 in J we have:
v(c, a′) ≤ β∗v(c, b′) + β∗2v(c, c′) + (1− β∗ − β∗2)v(c, a′).
and we obtain v(c, a′) ≤ 1
1+β∗
v(c, b′). But symmetrically we also have v(c, b′) ≤
1
1+β∗
v(c, a′), and we get v(c, a′) = v(c, b′) = 0.
Consider now v(a, c′). By P2, we obtain that v(a, c′) ≥ u(a, c′) = 1, and
v(a, c′) = 1. Similarly, v(b, c′) = 1.
Consider now v(a, a′). v being excessive, for any α > 0 in I we have:
v(a, a′) ≥ αv(b, a′) + α2v(c, a′) + (1− α− α2)v(a, a′).
Hence v(a, a′) ≥ 1
1+α
v(b, a′), and by assumption on I we obtain v(a, a′) ≥ v(b, a′).
By symmetry of the transitions between a and b, v(a, a′) = v(b, a′). Similarly,
v(a, b′) = v(b, b′).
It only remains to prove that v(a, a′) = v(a, b′). v being depressive, for any
β > 0 in J , v(a, a′) ≤ βv(a, b′) + β2v(a, c′) + (1− β − β2)v(a, a′). By assumption
on J , we get v(a, a′) ≤ v(a, b′). By symmetry of the transitions between b and b′,
v(a, b′) = v(a, a′), and v satisfies B).
One can easily check that B) implies A), and the proof of lemma 6.1 is com-
plete.
The second part of theorem 3.3 is a direct consequence of the following result.
Theorem 6.2.
1) If I = J = [0, 1/4], the limit value exists and is:
a′ b′ c′
a 1/2 1/2 1
b 1/2 1/2 1
c 0 0 0
2) If J = [0, 1/4] and I = {0, 1/4}, the limit value exists and is:
a′ b′ c′
a 0 0 1
b 0 0 1
c 0 0 0
3) If J = [0, 1/4] and I = { 1
4n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {0}, then vλ diverges.
17
6.2 Proof of theorem 6.2
We start with considerations valid for the 3 cases of the theorem. We fix J =
[0, 1/4] in all the proof, and only assume for the moment that I is a compact
subset of [0, 1/4] containing 0 and 1/4.
Consider λ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that vλ(c, c′) = 0, and vλ(a, c′) = vλ(b, c′) =
1. By symmetry of the payoffs and transitions, we have vλ(a, a
′) = vλ(b, b′),
vλ(b, a
′) = vλ(a, b′) and vλ(c, c′) = vλ(c, b′), so we can write vλ as:
a′ b′ c′
a xλ yλ 1
b yλ xλ 1
c zλ zλ 0
with xλ, yλ and zλ in (0, 1).
zλ is indeed easy to compute. If the game is at (c, a
′), Player 1 can not move,
and Player 2 wants to reach c′ as fast as possible, so he will choose β = 1/4 and
we have (see definition 2.8): zλ = λ1 + (1− λ)( 1160 + 1516zλ), so that:
zλ =
16λ
1 + 15λ
≤ 16λ. (4)
Proposition 6.3. Assume J = [0, 1/4], min I = 0 and max I = 1/4. Then for λ
small enough,
zλ < xλ < yλ, (5)
λ xλ = (1− λ)max
α∈I
(
α(yλ − xλ) + α2(zλ − xλ)
)
, (6)
λ yλ = λ+ (1− λ)min
β∈J
(
β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1− yλ)
)
. (7)
(6) express the fact that at (a, a′) or (b, b′), it is optimal for Player 2 to play
the pure strategy β = 0 (stay at the same location and wait until Player 1 has
moved), and Player 1 can play a pure strategy α there. Similarly, (7) express
the fact that at (a, b′) or (b, a′), it is optimal for Player 1 not to move. In spite
of these simple intuitions, the proof of the proposition is rather technical, and
relegated to the appendix.
Taking for granted proposition 6.3, we now proceed to the proof of theorem
6.2. It is simple to study the simple maximization problem of Player 2 given by
(7), which is simply minimizing a concave polynomial on the interval J = [0, 1/4].
If yλ − xλ ≤ 12(1 − yλ), the minimum in (7) is achieved for β = yλ−xλ2(1−yλ) , and
otherwise it is achieved for β = 1
4
. Hence for λ small enough:
If yλ − xλ ≤ 1
2
(1− yλ), 4λ(1− yλ)2 = (1− λ)(yλ − xλ)2. (8)
If yλ − xλ ≥ 1
2
(1− yλ), (1− yλ)(1 + 15λ) = 4(1− λ)(yλ − xλ). (9)
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Notice that the 2 inequalities of (9) imply 1 + 15λ ≥ 2(1 − λ), which is is not
possible for λ small. Consequently, for small discount factors the right hand side
of (8) holds, and we have proved, for λ small enough, the main equality of the
proof:
4λ(1− yλ)2 = (1− λ)(yλ − xλ)2. (10)
This clearly implies:
yλ − xλ −→λ→0 0.
For each λ > 0, denote by αλ ∈ I a maximizer in the expression (6), so that
λxλ = (1− λ)αλ(yλ − xλ) + (1− λ)α2λ(zλ − xλ). (11)
And since xλ > 0, αλ > 0.
The following lemma implies part 2) of theorem 6.2.
Lemma 6.4. If 0 is an isolated point in I, then yλ and xλ converge to 0.
Proof: In this case there exists α∗ > 0 such that αλ ≥ α∗ for all λ. Passing to
the limit in (11) gives the result.
We will now prove parts 1) and 3) of the theorem. The fact that I ⊂ J gives
an advantage to Player 2, which can be quantified as follows.
Lemma 6.5. Assume that yλn and xλn converge to v in [0, 1]. Then v ≤ 1/2,
and yλn − xλn ∼ 2
√
λn(1− v).
Proof: (1− λ)(yλ − xλ) = 2
√
λ
√
1− λ(1− yλ), so
xλ(λ+ α
2
λ) = λxλα
2
λ + (1− λ)α2λzλ + 2αλ
√
λ
√
1− λ(1− yλ) ≥ 2αλ
√
λxλ,
since λ + α2λ − 2αλ
√
λ ≥ 0. Dividing par αλ
√
λ and passing to the limit gives
2(1− v) ≥ 2v, so v ≤ 1/2, and the lemma is proved.
Consider again the concave optimization problem of Player 1 given by equation
(6), and denote by α∗(λ) = yλ−xλ
2(xλ−zλ) > 0 the argmax of the unconstrained problem
if Player 1 could choose any α ≥ 0. If yλ and xλ converge to v > 0, then
α∗(λ) ∼ √λ1−v
v
, and Player 1 would like to play in the λ-discounted game at
(a, a′) some α close to
√
λ1−v
v
.
Lemma 6.6. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that
√
λn ∈ I
for each n. Then yλn and xλn converge to 1/2.
Proof: By considering a converging subsequence we can assume that yλn and
xλn converge to some v in [0, 1]. By the previous lemma, v ≤ 1/2, and we have
to show that v ≥ 1/2. We have for each λ in the subsequence, since Player 1 can
choose to play α =
√
λ:
λxλ ≥ (1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + (1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ),
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so
xλ(2− λ) ≥ (1− λ)zλ + (1− λ)yλ − xλ√
λ
.
By passing to the limit, we get 2v ≥ 2(1− v), and v ≥ 1/2.
Lemma 6.7. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that for each
n, the open interval (1
2
√
λn, 2
√
λn) does not intersect I. Then lim supn yλn ≤ 4/9.
Proof: Suppose that (up to a subsequence) xλn and yλn converges to some v ≥
4/9. It is enough to show that v = 4/9. We know that v ≤ 1/2 by lemma 6.5, and
since α∗(λ) ∼ √λ1−v
v
we have 1
2
√
λ ≤ α∗(λ) ≥ 2√λ for λ small in the sequence.
By assumption (1
2
√
λ, 2
√
λ) contains no point in I and the objective function of
Player 1 is increasing from 0 to α∗(λ) and decreasing after α∗(λ). There are 2
possible cases:
If αλ ≤ 12
√
λ we have:
λxλ ≤ 1
2
(1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + 1
4
(1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ).
Dividing by λ and passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 1− v − 1
4
v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Otherwise, αλ > 2
√
λ and we have:
λxλ ≤ 2(1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + 4(1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ).
Again, dividing by λ and passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 4(1− v)−4v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Finally, lemma 6.6 proves part 1) of theorem 6.2, whereas lemmas 6.6 and 6.7
together imply part 3), concluding the proof of theorem 6.2.
Remarks 6.8.
• In case 3) of theorem 6.2, it is possible to show, using lemma (6.7), that
lim inf xλ = lim inf yλ = 4/9, and lim sup xλ = lim sup yλ = 1/2.
• It is not difficult to adapt lemma (6.7) to show the divergence of (vλ) as
soon as J = [0, 1/4] and I satisfies:
a) there exists a sequence (λn) converging to 0 such that
√
λn ∈ I for each n,
and
b) there exist η > 0 and a sequence (λn) converging to 0 such that for each
n, I does not intersect the interval [
√
λn(1− η),
√
λn(1 + η)].
• It is important for the counterexample that I = { 1
22n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {0} is not
semi-algebraic. Indeed, it has been showed that if we assume X and Y finite, and
the transitions Γ, Λ and the payoff u to be definable in some o-minimal structure,
then (vλ)λ converges [4].
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7 Corollaries and Extensions
7.1 Gambling houses (or Markov Decision Processes)
We assume here that there is a unique player, i.e. that Y is a singleton. Then
non expansiveness is enough to guarantee the uniform convergence of (vλ)λ (as
well as the uniform value, see [26]) and the limit v can be characterized as follows
[27]: for all x in X ,
v(x) = inf{w(x), w : ∆(X)→ IR affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀x′ ∈ X,w(x′) ≥ sup
p∈Γ(x′)
w(p), and (2) ∀r ∈ R,w(r) ≥ u(r)},
where R = {p ∈ ∆(X), (p, p) ∈ Graph Γ˜} is interpreted as the set of invariant
measures for the gambling house (which is not necessarily leavable here). If we
moreover assume that the gambling house is leavable, then R = ∆(X) and we
recover the fundamental theorem of gambling [6, 19], namely, (vλ) uniformly
converges to:
v = min{w ∈ C(X), w excessive , w ≥ u} = min{w ∈ B(X), w excessive , w ≥ u}.
It is also easy to see that v(x) = supp∈Γ∞(x) u(p) for each x.
Our approach will lead to other characterizations. We don’t assume any
acyclicity condition in the following result.
Theorem 7.1. Consider a one player (leavable and non-expansive) gambling
house. Then (vλ) uniformly converges to the unique function v in C(X) satisfying:
v is excessive, P1 : ∀x ∈ X, ∃p ∈ Γ∞(x), v(x) = v˜(p) ≤ u˜(p), and P2 : v ≥ u.
Proof: From proposition 3.5 any accumulation point of (vλ) is excessive and
satisfies P1 and P2. Thus, we just need to show uniqueness, which is a direct
consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. If v1 ∈ B(X) satisfies P1 and v2 ∈ C(X) is excessive and satisfies
P2, then v1 ≤ v2.
Proof: Take any x ∈ X . Then there is p ∈ Γ∞(x) such that v1(x) = v1(p) ≤ u(p).
Because v2 is excessive and continuous, by lemma 5.2 v2(x) ≥ v2(p). Since
v2 ≥ u, we have v2(p) ≥ u(p). Consequently, one has v2(x) ≥ u(p). Thus,
v1(x)− v2(x) ≤ 0, as desired.
Using the gambling fundamental theorem, we obtain new viewpoints on the
characterization of the limit value in leavable gambling houses.
Corollary 7.3. Consider a one player (leavable and non-expansive) gambling
house. Then the asymptotic value exists and is:
(1) the smallest excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P2;
(2) the largest excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P1;
(3) the unique excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P1 and P2.
Moreover, v is continuous.
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7.2 Equivalent characterizations
Definition 7.4. Given g in B(X × Y ), ExcΓ(g) is the smallest excessive (w.r.t.
X) function not lower than g, and DepΛ(g) is the largest depressive (w.r.t. Y )
function not greater than g.
ExcΓ is usually called the re´duite operator and DepΛ(g) = −ExcΓ(−g).
In splitting games, ExcΓ = CavX is the concavification operator on X and
DepΛ(g) = V exY is the convexification operator on Y . We introduce the fol-
lowing definition by analogy with the Mertens-Zamir characterization.
Definition 7.5. A function v in B(X × Y ) satisfies the MZ-characterization if:
MZ1 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, v(x, y) = ExcΓmin(u, v)(x, y),
andMZ2 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, v(x, y) = DepΛmax(u, v)(x, y).
We now introduce other properties, by analogy with the one established for
splitting games and repeated games with incomplete information, see for instance
[14, 15, 28].
Definition 7.6. Let v be in B(X × Y ).
1) For each (x, y) in X × Y ,
x is extreme for v(·, y) if argmaxp∈Γ∞(x) v˜(p, y) = {δx}.
y is extreme for v(x, ·) if argminq∈Λ∞(y) v˜(x, q) = {δy}.
2) v satisfies the E-characterization if:
E1 : for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, if x is extreme for v(·, y) then v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y),
and E2 : for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, if y is extreme for v(x , ·) then v(x, y) ≥ u(x, y).
Proposition 7.7. Consider a standard gambling game and let v in C(X × Y ) be
excessive and depressive. Then:
v satisfies MZ1 =⇒ v satisfies P1 =⇒ v satisfies E1,
and v satisfies MZ2 =⇒ v satisfies P2 =⇒ v satisfies E2.
Proof. Let v be a continuous excessive function that satisfies MZ1. Fix y and
define for each x, f(x) = min(v(x, y), u(x, y)). Then, for every x, v(x, y) =
ExcΓ(f)(x). We consider the gambling house for Player 1 where the state of
Player 2 is fixed to y and the payoff is given by f . From corollary 7.3, there is
p ∈ Γ∞(x) such that v(x, y) = v(p, y) ≤ f(p). Since f(p) ≤ u(p, y), v satisfies
P1.
Now, let v be an excessive continuous function that satisfies P1. Take any
x and y and suppose that x is extreme for v(·, y). By P1, there is p∗ ∈ Γ∞(x)
such that v(x, y) = v(p∗, y) ≤ u(p∗, y). Because v is excessive and continuous,
by lemma 5.2 we have p∗ ∈ argmaxp∈Γ∞ v˜(p, y). Because x is extreme for v(·, y),
p∗ = δx and so, v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y). Consequently, E1 is satisfied.
By symmetry, MZ2 =⇒ P2 =⇒ E2.
22
Remark 7.8. It is easy to find examples where E1 is satisfied but MZ1 is not.
For instance, assume that Y is a singleton, and that Γ(x) = ∆(X) for each x in
X . Consider the constant, hence excessive, functions u = 0 and v = 1. v has no
extreme points hence satisfies E1, but ExcΓmin(u, v) = u and v does not satisfy
MZ1.
Proposition 7.9. Consider a standard gambling game and let v be an excessive-
depressive function in C(X × Y ). Then:
(Γ strongly acyclic) and (v satisfies E1) =⇒ (v satisfies MZ1),
and;
(Λ strongly acyclic) and (v satisfies E2) =⇒ (v satisfies MZ2).
Consequently, if the gambling game is strongly acyclic, characterizationsMZ,
P and E are equivalents.
Proof. Let v be excessive-depressive that satisfies E1. Fix y ∈ Y . We want
to show that v(x, y) = g(x, y) where g = ExcΓ(f) and f = min(u, v). g is
continuous by corollary 7.3. Since v is excessive and v ≥ f , we have v ≥ g. Let
Z = argmaxx∈X v(x, y) − g(x, y) and let x0 = argminx∈Z ϕ(x), where ϕ comes
form the definition of acyclicity. It is enough to prove that v(x0, y) ≤ g(x0, y).
Suppose not. We have g(x0, y) ≥ f(x0, y), so (1) g(x0, y) ≥ u(x0, y). Now,
let p0 ∈ Γ∞(x0) such that v(x0, y) = v(p0, y). Because g is excessive and con-
tinuous, g(p0, y) ≤ g(x0, y) (lemma 5.2). Consequently, v(p0, y) − g(p0, y) ≥
v(x0, y)−g(x0, y). Consequently, p0 is supported on Z. Thus, ϕ(x0, y) ≤ ϕ(p0, y),
and by strong acyclicity p0 = δx0. Thus x0 is an extreme point of v(·, y). By E1,
we have (2) v(x0, y) ≤ u(x0, y). By (1) and (2), v(x0, y)− g(x0, y) ≤ 0. A con-
tradiction.
7.3 Uniform optimal strategies in idempotent games
7.3.1 Idemptotent gambling games
Definition 7.10. The gambling game is idempotent if Γ ◦ Γ = Γ and Λ ◦Λ = Λ.
In that case, clearly Γ = Γ∞ and Λ = Λ∞. Any state that could be reached in
several stages can be reached immediately in a single stage. This holds true for
instance in splitting games. Notice also that for any Γ, the multifunction Γ∞ is
idempotent. If Γ ◦ Γ = Γ , then Γ(x) = Γ˜n(δx) = Γ∞(x) for all n and x so if the
gambling game is idempotent the notions of weak and strong acyclicity coincide.
An immediate corollary of theorem 3.3 is the following.
Corollary 7.11. Consider a standard idempotent gambling game where a player
has an acyclic gambling house. Then {vλ} converges uniformly to the unique
function v in C(X × Y ) which is excessive, depressive and satisfies:
Q1 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃p ∈ Γ(x), v(x, y) = v(p, y) ≤ u(p, y),
Q2 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃q ∈ Λ(y), v(x, y) = v(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
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7.3.2 Uniform value and optimal strategies
In repeated and stochastic games, a stronger notion of limit value is given by the
uniform value. As usual, a strategy of Player 1, resp. Player 2, is a measurable
rule giving at every stage t, as a function of past and current states, an element
in Γ(xt), resp. of Λ(yt), where xt and yt are the states of stage t. A pair (x1, y1)
of initial states and a pair of strategies (σ, τ) naturally define a probability on
the set of plays (X × Y )∞ (with the product σ-algebra, X and Y being endowed
with their Borel σ-algebra), which expectation is written IE(x1,y1),σ,τ .
Definition 7.12. w ∈ B(X × Y ) is the uniform value of the gambling game and
both players have optimal uniform strategies if:
There exists a strategy σ of Player 1 that uniformly guarantees w: for any
ε > 0, there is N such that for any any n ≥ N and initial states (x1, y1), for any
strategy τ of Player 2, IE(x1,y1),σ,τ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)
) ≥ w(x1, y1)− ε.
And similarly, there exists a strategy τ of Player 2 that uniformly guarantees
w: for any ε > 0, there is N such that for any n ≥ N and initial states (x1, y1),
for any strategy σ of Player 1, IE(x1,y1),σ,τ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)
) ≤ w(x1, y1) + ε.
It is known [31] that the above conditions imply similar inequalities for discounted
payoffs: for Player 1, the same strategy σ is such that for any ε > 0, there is λ0 > 0
satisfying: for any λ ≤ λ0, (x1, y1) and τ , IE(x1,y1),σ,τ (λ
∑∞
t=1(1− λ)t−1u(xt, yt)) ≥
w(x1, y1)− ε. And if the uniform value exists, it has to be v = limλvλ = limnvn.
7.3.3 Adapted strategies
Our main theorem 3.3 suggests particularly interesting strategies for the players.
Consider again conditions P1 and P2, and fix a pair of states (x, y). If u(x, y) ≥
v(x, y), the running payoff of Player 1 is at least as good as the payoff he should
expect in the long run, so we may consider that Player 1 is “quite happy” with
the current situation and in order to satisfy P1 it is enough for him not to move,
i.e. to choose p = δx. If on the contrary u(x, y) < v(x, y), Player 2 is happy
with the current situation and can choose q = δy to satisfy P2, whereas Player
1 should do something, and a possibility is to move towards a p satisfying P1.
This looks interesting for Player 1 because if Player 2 does not react, eventually
the distribution on states will approach (p, y) and (in expectation) Player 1 will
be happy again with the current situation since u(p, y) ≥ v(p, y).
Definition 7.13. Let w in B(X × Y ).
A strategy of Player 1 is adapted to w if whenever the current state is (x, y),
it plays p ∈ Γ(x) such that w(x, y) ≤ w(p, y) ≤ u(p, y).
A strategy of Player 2 is adapted to w if whenever the current state is (x, y),
it plays q ∈ Γ(y) such that w(x, y) ≥ w(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
If w satisfies Q1, resp. Q2, Player 1, resp. Player 2, has a strategy adapted to
w (using a measurable selection theorem [1]). If moreover w is excessive, we have
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w(x, y) = w(p, y) ≤ u(p, y). Mertens Zamir [23] in repeated games with incom-
plete information and Oliu-Barton [25] in splitting games used similar strategies
derived from the MZ-characterization instead of the Q-characterization.
7.3.4 Vanishing L1-variation
In repeated games with incomplete information or in splitting games, an impor-
tant property is that any martingale on a simplex has bounded variations. This
suggests the following.
Definition 7.14. A gambling house Γ has vanishing L1-variation if for every
ε > 0, there is N such that for all n ≥ N and any sequence (pt) s.t. pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt),
one has 1
n
∑n
t=1 dKR(pt+1, pt) ≤ ε.
The proof of the next result is inspired by Oliu-Barton [25] in the framework of
splitting games. He shows that Player 1 (resp. Player 2) can uniformly guarantee
any excessive-depressive function satisfying MZ1 (resp. MZ2). Our proof is
much shorter because it uses the new Q-characterization.
Proposition 7.15. In a standard gambling game where Γ has vanishing L1-
variation, if w in B(X×Y ) is excessive-depressive and satisfies Q1, then a strategy
of Player 1 adapted to w uniformly guarantees w.
Proof: Fix ε > 0. Because Lipschitz functions are dense in the set of continuous
functions, there exists K > 0 and a K-Lispchtiz function uε that is uniformly ε-
close to u. Consider w in B(X×Y ) be an excessive-depressive function satisfying
Q1, let σ be a strategy of Player 1 adapted to w and let τ be any strategy of
Player 2. We fix the initial states and write IE = IE(x1,y1),σ,τ .
Then, the average payoff of the n-stage game is:
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt, yt)
)
=
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt, yt)− u(xt+1, yt)
)
+
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
≥ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
uε(xt, yt)− uε(xt+1, yt)
)
− 2ε+ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
≥ −K
n
(
n∑
t=1
dKR(pt+1, pt)
)
− 2ε+ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
Because the gambling game is of vanishing variation, there is N such that
when n ≥ N one has K
n
∑n
t=1 dKR(pt+1, pt) ≤ ε. Because of Q1, IE(u(xt+1, yt)) ≥
IE(w(xt+1, yt)) = IE(w(xt, yt)). Since w is depressive, IE(w(xt, yt) ≥ IE(w(xt, yt−1)),
so that IE(w(xt+1, yt)) ≥ IE(w(xt, yt−1)), and this property holds for every t.
Consequently, IE(u(xt+1, yt)) ≥ IE(w(x2, y1)) = w(x1, y1). We obtain finally
1
n
IE(
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)) ≥ w(x1, y1)− 3ε, ending the proof.
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Corollary 7.16. If Γ and Λ have vanishing L1-variations then there is at most
one excessive-depressive function in B(X × Y ) satisfying Q1 and Q2.
Proof: If such a function exists, it can be guaranteed by both players. So it must
be the uniform value of the game, which is unique whenever it exists.
Combining proposition 3.5, proposition 7.15 and corollary 7.16, we obtain the
existence of the uniform value in a class of gambling games:
Theorem 7.17. In a standard and idempotent gambling game where Γ and Λ
have vanishing L1-variation, the uniform value v exists, and strategies adapted to
v are uniformly optimal. Moreover, v is the unique excessive-depressive function
in B(X × Y ) satisfying Q1 and Q2.
Proof: From proposition 3.5, any accumulation point of vλ satisfies P1 and P2,
i.e. Q1 and Q2, so is unique and is the uniform value, as shown above.
Observe that acyclicity is not assumed in theorem 7.17. But vanishing L1-
variation is a form of acyclicity (it rules out for example non-constant periodic
orbits). A more formal link between acyclicity and vanishing variation is given
in section 9.3 of the Appendix.
8 Open problems and future directions
We introduce the class of gambling games. It is a sub-class of stochastic games
which includes MDP problems, splitting games and product stochastic games.
We define a strong notion of acyclicity under which we prove existence of the
asymptotic value v and we establish several characterizations of v which are linked
to the Mertens-Zamir system of functional equations (re-formulated in our more
general set-up). We also prove that our condition is tight: a slight weakening
of acyclicity implies non-existence of the asymptotic value. Our example is the
first in the class of product stochastic games and is probably the simplest known
counterexample of convergence for finite state spaces and compact action set (the
first counterexample in this class was established by Vigeral [33]). Many questions
merit to be investigated in a future research:
• In standard gambling games, is it possible to characterize the asymptotic
value in models where we know it exists (for example when X and Y are
finite, transition function is polynomial and Γ and Λ are definable [4] in
an o-minimal structure)? We know that the asymptotic value is excessive-
depressive and satisfy P1 and P2, but this does not fully characterize it.
• Is there an asymptotic value if one house is strongly acyclic and the other not
necessarily leavable? As seen, even when both houses are weakly acyclic, we
may have divergence: strong acyclicity of one of the two houses is necessary.
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• Is there a strongly acyclic gambling game where the uniform value fails to
exist?
• Recently splitting games have been extended to continuous time and linked
to differential games with incomplete information [10]. How our model
and results extend to continuous time? The one player game has been
investigated [5, 18].
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of proposition 2.4
u being uniformly continuous over the compact set X×Y , we consider a concave
modulus of continuity ω : IR+ −→ IR+:
|u(x, y)− u(x′, y′)| ≤ ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), ∀x, x′ ∈ X, ∀y, y′ ∈ Y.
ω is non decreasing, concave and lim0 ω = 0. Denote by C the set of functions
v in C(X × Y ) satisfying: |v(x, y) − v(x′, y′)| ≤ ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), ∀x, x′ ∈
X, ∀y, y′ ∈ Y. We start with a lemma.
Lemma 9.1. For v in C, p, p′ in ∆(X), q, q′ in ∆(Y ),
|v˜(p, q)− v˜(p′, q′)| ≤ ω(dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′)).
Proof of lemma 9.1: By the Kantorovich duality theorem, there exists µ in
∆(X ×X) with first marginal p and second marginal p′ satisfying: dKR(p, p′) =∫
X×X d(x, x
′)dµ(x, x′). Similarly there exists ν in ∆(Y × Y ) with first marginal
q and second marginal q′ satisfying: dKR(q, q′) =
∫
Y×Y d(y, y
′)dν(y, y′). We have
for all x, x′, y, y′:
v(x, y) ≥ v(x′, y′)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)).
We integrate the above inequality with respect to the probability µ ⊗ ν, and
obtain using the concavity of ω:
v˜(p, q) ≥ v˜(p′, q′)−
∫
X2×Y 2
ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)) dµ(x, x′)dν(y, y′),
≥ v˜(p′, q′)− ω
(∫
X2×Y 2
d(x, x′) + d(y, y′) dµ(x, x′)dν(y, y′)
)
= v˜(p′, q′)− ω (dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′)) .
We now return to the proof of proposition 2.4. Fix λ in (0, 1]. Given v in C, define
Φ(v) : X×Y −→ IR by: Φ(v)(x, y) = supp∈Γ(x) infq∈Λ(y) λ u(x, y)+(1−λ) v˜(p, q).
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Consider the zero-sum game with strategy spaces Γ(x) and Λ(y) and payoff func-
tion (p, q) 7→ λ u(x, y) + (1− λ) v˜(p, q). The strategy spaces are convex compact
and the payoff function is is continuous and affine in each variable, hence by
Sion’s theorem we have:
Φ(v)(x, y) = max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
λ u(x, y)+(1−λ) v˜(p, q) = min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
λ u(x, y)+(1−λ) v˜(p, q).
Consider (x, y) and (x′, y′) in X×Y , and let p in Γ(x) be an optimal strategy
of Player 1 in the zero-sum game corresponding to (x, y). The gambling game
has non expansive transitions, so there exists p′ ∈ Γ(x′) such that dKR(p, p′) ≤
d(x, x′). Consider any q′ in Λ(y′), there exists q in Γ(y) with dKR(q, q′) ≤ d(y, y′).
Now, using lemma 9.1 we write:
λu(x′, y′) + (1− λ)v˜(p′, q′)
≥ λ(u(x, y)−ω(d(x, x′)+d(y, y′))+(1−λ)(v˜(p, q)−ω(dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′))),
≥ Φ(v)(x, y)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)).
We obtain Φ(v)(x′, y′) ≥ Φ(v)(x, y)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), and Φ(v) belongs
to C.
The rest of the proof is very standard. C is a complete metric space for ‖v −
w‖ = sup(x,y)∈X×Y |v(x, y)−w(x, y)|, and we have ‖Φ(v)−Φ(w)‖ ≤ (1−λ)‖v−w‖,
so Φ is (1 − λ)-contracting. Hence Φ has a unique fixed point which is vλ. Each
vλ is in C, and we obtain that the family (vλ)λ∈(0,1] is equicontinuous, ending the
proof of proposition 2.4.
9.2 Proof of proposition 6.3
We proceed in 4 steps.
1. The game at (b, a′): It is intuitively clear that yλ ≥ xλ since Player 1 is
better off when the players have different locations. We now formalize this idea.
Consider the game at (b, a′). The current payoff is 1, and Player 1 has the option
not to move, so we obtain by definition 2.8:
yλ ≥ λ+ (1− λ)min
β∈J
(βxλ + (1− β − β2)yλ + β21).
This implies
λyλ ≥ λ+ (1− λ)min
β∈J
(β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1− yλ)),
and since yλ ≤ 1, we obtain: xλ ≤ yλ. Now, minβ∈J(β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1 − yλ)) ≥
minβ∈J β(xλ − yλ) + minβ∈J β2(1− yλ) = 1/4(xλ − yλ), hence:
(1− λ)(yλ − xλ) ≥ 4λ(1− yλ). (12)
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In the same spirit, in the game at (a, a′), Player 2 has the option not to move, so
we have:
xλ ≤ (1− λ)max
α∈I
(αyλ + (1− α− α2)xλ + α2zλ).
Hence,
λxλ ≤ (1− λ)max
α∈I
(α(yλ − xλ) + α2(zλ − xλ)). (13)
2. The game at (a, a′): Consider now the game at (a, a′). By definition
2.8, xλ is the value of the game (possibly played with mixed strategies), where
Player 1 chooses α in I, Player 2 chooses β in J and the payoff to Player 1 is:
(1− λ)gλ(α, β), where gλ(α, β) =
xλ((1−α−α2)(1−β−β2)+αβ)+yλ(β(1−α−α2)+α(1−β−β2))+β2(1−α2)1+α2(1−β2)zλ.
We want to prove that in this game, it is a dominant strategy for Player 2 not
to move, that is to choose β = 0. We need to show that for all α and β,
gλ(α, 0) ≤ gλ(α, β). As a function of β, gλ(α, β) can be written as a constant
plus:
β(1− 2α− α2)(yλ − xλ) + β2(−(1− α− α2)xλ − αyλ + 1− α2 − α2zλ).
So we want to show that for all α in I, β in J :
(1− 2α− α2 − αβ)(yλ − xλ) + β((1− α2)(1− xλ)− α2zλ) ≥ 0
Since the expression is decreasing in α, it is enough to prove it with α = 1/4:
(7− 4β)(yλ − xλ) + β(15(1− xλ)− zλ) ≥ 0.
This is true for β = 0, and will be true for all β in J if and only if it is true for
β = 1/4, so we are left with proving:
24(yλ − xλ) + 15(1− xλ)− zλ ≥ 0. (14)
Consider λ ≤ 1/32, and recall that zλ ≤ 16λ. If xλ ≤ 1/2, then clearly (14)
holds. Assume on the contrary that xλ ≥ 1/2, then zλ ≤ xλ, and (13) gives:
λxλ ≤ (1− λ)14(yλ − xλ) + 0, so (yλ − xλ) ≥ 2λ and (14) holds as well.
We have shown that in the λ-discounted game at (a, a′) with λ ≤ 1/32, Player
2 has a pure dominant strategy which is β = 0. Considering a pure best reply
of Player 1 against this strategy implies that the game at (a, a′) has a value in
pure strategies satisfying xλ = (1− λ)maxα∈I(αyλ + (1− α− α2)xλ + α2zλ), i.e.
equation (6) is proved.
3. Small discount factors: For the sake of contradiction, assume that zλn ≥
xλn for a vanishing sequence λn of discount factors. Then by equation (6), we
have for each n:
λnxλn = (1− λn)(
1
4
(yλn − xλn) +
1
16
(zλn − xλn)).
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Since zλn converges to 0, so does xλn and yλn, and moreover
yλn−xλn
λn
converges to
0. This is in contradiction with equation (12). We have shown (5).
4. The game at (b, a′) again: We proceed as for the game at (a, a′) and will
show that in the game at (b, a′), it is a dominant strategy for Player 1 not to
move. By definition, yλ is the value of the game where Player 1 chooses α in I,
Player 2 chooses β in J and the payoff is λ+ (1− λ)hλ(α, β), with hλ(α, β) =
yλ((1−α−α2)(1−β−β2)+αβ)+xλ(β(1−α−α2)+α(1−β−β2))+β2(1−α2)1+α2(1−β2)zλ.
We want to show that hλ(0, β) ≥ hλ(α, β) for all α and β. That is, for all α and
β,
(xλ − yλ)(1− 2β − αβ − β2) + α((1− β2)(zλ − yλ)− β2) ≤ 0.
For λ small enough, we have zλ ≤ xλ ≤ yλ, and the above property is satis-
fied. Hence in the game at (b, a′) it is dominant for Player 1 to choose α = 0.
Consequently, Player 2 has a pure optimal strategy and we can write:
yλ = λ+ (1− λ)min
β∈J
(βxλ + (1− β − β2)yλ + β2),
proving equation (7). And the proof of proposition 6.3 is complete.
9.3 L2-variation, L1-variation and acyclicity
Definition 9.2. A gambling house Γ is of bounded L2-variation if there is C > 0
such that for every sequences {pt} satisfying pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt), one has
∞∑
t=1
dKL(pt+1, pt)
2 ≤ C < +∞
For example splitting games have bounded L2-variation.
Proposition 9.3. If Γ is idempotent, non-expansive, leavable and of bounded
L2-variation, then it is acyclic and has vanishing L1-variation.
Proof: Bounded L2-variation =⇒ weak acyclicity because the real valued
function:
ϕ(x) = sup
{(pt) s.t. p0=x and pt+1∈Γ˜(pt)}
∞∑
t=1
dKL(pt+1, pt)
2,
is strictly decreasing along non-constant orbits of Γ˜ (i.e. argmaxp∈Γ(x) ϕ(p) = δx).
But for idempotent Γ, weak acyclicity and acyclicity coincide because Γ∞ = Γ.
Continuity of ϕ is a consequence of non-expansivity of Γ and the fact the bound C
is uniform over the sequences {pt} satisfying pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt). Finally, that bounded
L2-variation implies vanishing L1-variation is a consequence of Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality ( 1
n
∑n
t=1 dKL(pt+1, pt) ≤ 1√n
√∑n
t=1 dKL(pt+1, pt)
2).
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